Undead Soldiers / UNDEADSOVI

BASIC PRINCIPLES IN SOVIET SPACE LAW:
PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE, PEACEFUL
COOPERATION, AND DISARMAMENT
ROBERT D. CRANO
During recent years the Soviets have increasingly used law as a subtle but
effective instrument to control the minds of men and thereby to prepare the
general political environment for the more effective execution of Soviet policy.
International law has become for the Soviets a potential matrix and framework
for the entire Soviet policy of world revolution. Space law has become a particularly important part of the developing science of Soviet international law, because
it serves to prepare the way for Communist military use of space to deter effective
Western military opposition to Communist expansion here on earth.

1 PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE

The strategic doctrine which the Communists have adopted to pursue their
expansionist foreign policies is known in the new Communist jargon as “peaceful
coexistence.” It is important to understand the nature of this revolutionary doctrine,
because it determines all the basic principles of Soviet space law. In the introduction
to the second symposium of the Space Law Commission of the Soviet Academy of
Sciences, edited by G. P. Zhukov, the Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Space Law
Commission, Professor G. P. Zadorozhnyy, stated that “every activity in outer
space whatsoever which is incompatible with the principle of peaceful coexistence
is illegal.”’
Some scholars in the West believe that Soviet support of peaceful coexistence
reflects, as Professor Edward McWhinney puts it, a “common interest in minimum
rules of world order,” and “a sort of nuclear age ‘due process’ governing fundamental
East-West relations.“2 Professor McWhinney, who is a Canadian member of the
International Law Association and a member of its committee charged with the
study of peaceful coexistence, believes that this is particularly true after the Cuban
crisis. He has stated that there is, to be sure, a “hard-line, neo Stalinist core of
Soviet juristic thinking which would use peaceful coexistence as no more than a
convenient camouflage for achieving ‘proletarian internationalism’ in the special
0 A.B. 1955, Northwestern University; LL.B. x959, Harvard University. Research Principal of The
Center for Strategic Studies, and Chairman of its Study Program on Arms Control, Georgetown University.
1 Zadorozhnyy, In Honor of the Seventieth Birthday of Yevgeniy Aleksandrovich Korovin (in Russian),
in G. P. ZHUKOV (ED.), KosMtos I 7MEZHD INARo0DoYE SOTRUDNICHESrvo 8 (1963). All translations from
the Russian, unless otherwise indicated, are by the author.
2 McWhinney, “Coexistence,” the Cuban Crisis, and Cold War International Law, International Journal,
Win. 1962-63, p. 68.
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
sense of coordinated world revolution.“3 He contends that this conflicts with “the
currently orthodox Soviet thinking on peaceful coexistence, associated with Premier
Khrushchev . . . which bears some comparisons obviously to Leninist notions of
‘Socialism in one country.”’ Professor McWhinney adds:
Peaceful coexistence, as so developed by Soviet jurists and policy-makers, is, of course, a
somewhat static, conservative, even reactionary doctrine …. For peaceful coexistence in
this sense amounts virtually to a legitimation of the political and military status quo of
the cold war era. In so far as it would accept the de facto situation of the bi-polar
division of the world into the two great military blocs dominated respectively by the
United States and the Soviet Union, it would necessarily concede general control and
responsibility by each bloc leader over its own sphere of influence. It would further
proclaim a principle of non-interference by either the United States or the Soviet Union
in the other’s bloc, however great the temptation to profit by the other side’s difficulties
at any time might be, and however great the moral anguish at not being able to intervene
in specific cases. 4
I quote this statement by Professor McWhinney because it is the clearest statement
I have ever encountered of exactly what “peaceful coexistence” is not, and because it
conflicts completely with the Soviet’s own definition of peaceful coexistence.
A colleague of mine at the Center for Strategic Studies, Richard Allen, has
presented in some detail the Communists’ own views on peaceful coexistence in a
chapter he has written for the book, Detente: Cold War Strategies in Transition.’
It would be enlightening to ponder the Communists’ own statements on the subject
of peaceful coexistence which Professor Allen has made available to scholars in the
field.
A recent Communist book by H. Dona on peaceful coexistence published last
year explains that “some try to reduce the notion of peaceful coexistence to the
renunciation of war. But peace and peaceful coexistence are not one and the
same thing.” The Soviet author Shishlin comments on the detente following the
recent test-ban treaty as follows:
In view of the Communists, peaceful coexistence between the two systems is certainly
not a passive process in which there is some sort of parallel development of capitalism and
socialism, no freezing of social relationships, or strengthening of the status quo in the
relationship between the forces of socialism and capitalism, but an active and intense
struggle, in the course of which socialism irresistibly attacks, while capitalism suffers
one defeat after another.6
The above quoted book by Dona states that “the struggle of the people against
reactionary regimes cannot -be dissolved by international agreement. For this
struggle to cease, the causes eliciting it must be eliminated, i.e., capitalism must be
liquidated.”
‘Id. at 69-70.
‘Id. at 71-72.
‘Allen, Peace or Peaceful Coexistence?, in ELEANOR LANSING DULLES & ROBERT D. CRANE (EDs.),
DETErTE: COLD WAt STRAxEGIS IN TRANsrON 23-62 (1964).
‘See the discussion in Allen, supra note 5, at 30.
BASIC PRINCIPLES IN SOVIET SPACE LAW 945
In the deterministic framework of Communist thinking, which most nonCommunists find impossible to take seriously or even to understand, capitalism
actually causes the Communists to wage a struggle against it, and therefore capitalism
must be destroyed to stop the struggle. As Premier Khrushchev put it in August
1963 following the signing of the nuclear test ban treaty:
If everyone acted and thought in the Communist way then there would be no antagonistic
classes and communism would already be victorious everywhere. However, while there
are still two systems, socialists and capitalists, each system has its own policy, its own
course, and we cannot but take into account the fact that two systems exist. A fight is in
progress between these two systems, a life and death combat. But we Communists want
to win this struggle with the least losses [note that he does not exclude the necessity for
losses] and there is no doubt whatsoever that we shall win.7
Perhaps the best definition of peaceful coexistence by a Western student of the
subject was given by Richard Allen, as follows:
Peaceful coexistence is to the Communists a unilateral strategic doctrine, which is imposed upon the “inevitably doomed” adversary through the combined inherent and physical “superiority” of the Communist system, and to which the adversary may only “respond”
because he is denied a creative and participating role in determining its essence and
application.8
This creative role of “peaceful coexistence” must be emphasized because the
essence of peaceful coexistence is its revolutionary and aggressive nature, its commitment to total victory by whatever means are best suited under the given circumstances.
These means include the use of armed force and nuclear blackmail whenever the
Communists believe that the risks of such use are outweighed by the gains which may
be achieved. The Cuban crisis, and any crises we may have in the future, are not
necessarily aberrations from peaceful coexistence, but result merely from a specific
application of this doctrine, perhaps sometimes unsuccessfully, in a given time and
place. The remarkable thing about peaceful coexistence is that it is growing in
complexity and sophistication to encompass almost anything the Soviets may want to
do in pursuit of their goal of total global victory.
The most interesting development for the American lawyer and political scientist
is the Soviet attempt to clothe peaceful coexistence in legal terms. The dean of
Soviet space lawyers, Professor Yevgeniy Korovin, stated last April that
One of the consequences of Socialism’s transformation into the decisive factor of international relations is that peaceful coexistence has gradually become an accepted principle of
international law. Initially it was the expression of a peaceful “breathing space,” but
being a specific form of class struggle between Socialism and capitalism on an international scale, peaceful coexistence was filled with new content as the relation of world
forces changed 7 Nikita S. Khrushchev, Speech at the Soviet-American Hungarian Meeting, July 19, 1963, in Current
Soviet Documents, Aug. x9, 1963, pp. 9, 13.
s Allen, supra note 5, at 33.
‘Korovin, An Old and Futile Demand, International Affairs (Moscow), No. 4, at ioo (1963).
LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
In an earlier address to the Advisory Council of the University of Moscow Law
School in i96i, which first set forth the essence of the new international law of
“peaceful coexistence,” Professor Korovin stated that the time had come for Soviet
international lawyers to wage what he termed an “offensive attack,” that they should
“proceed from our own concepts, from the democratic principles of international
law, and then, having proclaimed their binding character and universality, to show
that any theories hostile to them constitute a violation of the generally recognized
and therefore generally binding principles of law …”“
The implication for Soviet space law was clearly stated in the new Soviet space
law symposium, as quoted earlier, that “every activity in outer space whatsoever
which is incompatible with the principle of peaceful coexistence is illegal.” If the
task of peaceful coexistence is to ensure that communism triumphs over capitalism
as quickly and as effectively as possible, the resistance which the non-Communist
world may put up is basically contradictory to “law” and hence is “illegal.”

2 PEACEFUL COOPERATION
The second basic principle in Soviet space law, according to the introduction to
the new Soviet space law symposium is “peaceful cooperation.”’” This principle has
evoked considerable discussion among Soviet international lawyers because the initial
dispute back in 1956 among’Soviet and American international lawyers over “peaceful coexistence” arose from the the Soviet opposition to Western lawyers who wanted
to replace the term “peaceful coexistence” with the term “peaceful cooperation.”
The Westerners preferred the term “peaceful cooperation” in order to portray the
Western concept of increasing reliance on mutuality of interest in foreign affairs and
to portray the idea that international institutions for conflict resolution should replace
unilateral conflict management as the ordering element of international relations.
This problem received a thorough airing last year at the Sixth Annual Meeting
of the Soviet Association of International Law. Movchan led off the discussion by
a speech on the legal principles of peaceful coexistence, in which he reminded his
listeners that the i96i Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union foresees
a real possibility that new principles put forth by socialism will triumph over the
principles of aggressive imperialist states. He suggested that the codification of
international law should serve to make the content of the existing principles and
norms conform to the developmental laws of contemporary society, by which he
meant the shift of the correlation of forces in favor of Communism. Movchan evoked
considerable criticism by stating that the principle of friendly relations among
states-and by implication “peaceful cooperation”—is the same as peaceful co-
“0 Korovin, The Declaration of the Conference of Representatives of Communist and Wor~ers’ Parties
and the Tasks of the Science of International Law (in Russian), [1961] VESTNIX MOsKOVSKOaO UNIv .srrETA 71-72. See also the discussion in Crane, Soviet Attitude Toward International Space Law, 56
Am. J. INT’L L. 685, 713 (1962). 11 ZDoRoZHNYY, supra note I, at 8.
BASIC PRINCIPLES IN SOVIET SPACE LAw 947
existence. The critics, of course, objected that such a confusion of terms would
ignore the character of the relationship of class warfare between the socialist and
capitalist states. After all, as Zakharova had pointed out:
Contemporary international law, which regulates the relations both of socialist and
capitalist states, does not require the establishment among such states of relations of broad
and full cooperation and fraternal mutual assistance, because by virtue of the very nature
of capitalist states such relations are impossible.’ 2
The solution to this problem was suggested at the Sixth Annual Meeting of the
Soviet Association of International Law by V. M. Koretsky, who is presently the
Soviet judge in the United Nations’ principal legal organ, the International Court of
Justice. Mr. Koretsky pointed out, as indeed Mr. Tunkin had done himself on
November 21, i961, in the Sixth Committee of the United Nations, that the essence
of peaceful coexistence as a doctrine must be distinguished from the principles
of peaceful coexistence put forward as principles of international law. Koretsky
stated that peaceful coexistence in its essence and intent is an historical category
of class warfare, but that the legal principles put forth under the rubric of peaceful
coexistence can permit compromises with capitalism to achieve agreements under
specific circumstances to strengthen the peace, because “it is necessary to consider
not only one’s intentions but one’s possibilities” at the present moment.
In effect Koretsky was reminding the Soviet international lawyers that Marxism
distinguishes between strategy and tactics. The support of “peaceful coexistence”
as a Communist term and “peaceful cooperation” as a term to use in dealing with
the capitalists is quite consistent with the Leninist policy of dealing simultaneously
with the proletariat and with the bourgeoise as explained in his treatise entitled The
Two Tactics of Social Democracy. This technique is discussed both in Stalin’s
work, Problems of Leninism, and in the standard work on Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, the most recent edition of which was published last year.
The concepts of interdependence and supranational institutions, such as the United
Nations and the International Court of Justice, which many Westerners consider to be
basic elements and instruments of international cooperation, were attacked in the
recent Zhukov symposium on space law, which specifically rejected the concept of
a single global communications satellite system. They were also attacked at a recent
Conference of International Lawyers in Moscow devoted to the discussion of legal
order in a disarmed world. This conference, which was sponsored by the Commission on Legal Problems of Disarmament of the Soviet Committee on the Defense
of the Peace, was reported in the October 1963 issue of Soviet State and Law. At
this conference, Levin stated that as long as states of two different systems existed,
international organizations with wide supranational powers would be impossible,
because such organizations, as has been proven in the West, interfere with the
internal affairs of states.
2 Zakharova, Bilateral Treaties of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Aid Among Socialist States (in
Russian), [r962) SovrsxoYE GOSUDARTVO ai PRAvo, No. 2, at 8o, 83 (x962).
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
The clearest Soviet statement on this problem is contained in an article by
Solodovnikov:
It is stated that the development of the weapons of mass annihilation and the simplification of their manufacture will impel the two systems to seek points of “convergence” and
agree to international inspection which will gradually grow into a “world government”
placed above the still raging cold war.
This, it appears, is the end aim of “convergence,” this is the path to salvation suggested
by the apologists of capitalism.
The concept of a future in which capitalism and Communism will “converge” on an “equal footing” is Utopian through and through. The time will come, of course, when
there will be a world government, but it will be the government of a world Socialist
community in which there will be no place either for “free enterprise” or for the
monopolies. Neither research nor the subtle sophisms of the apologists of capitalism can
save it from the death predestined for it by history….
Life will always smash the advocates of ideological compromises and their bleak
illusions and attempts to find a “third way” in the struggle of the two systems.
Our Socialist world is definitely helping capitalism in one thing: to dig its grave the
more quickly. Such are the facts of the “fruitful” competition of the two systems.18
Premier Khrushchev made this quite plain early this year when he stated that
the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Communists had their disagreements on
the correct line to follow during the present period, but that they both agreed that
their basic policy was to bury capitalism. The Chinese and Soviets differ, and have
since 1957, on the risks of nuclear escalation from certain types of expansionist moves
and on the advisability of waiting until the Soviets could gain greater strategic
power to reduce these risks. 4 They both look at international cooperation, however, as a tactic which can be used advantageously whenever it is called for by their
respective strategic evaluations of the world situation.
One of the tactical uses which the Soviets make of their second basic space legal
principle is indicated by the following statement of the Soviet representative to the
U.N. Space Committee, Ambassador Platon Dimitrivich Morozov:
In any case in which discussion of international cooperation in any field takes place, it
immediately becomes necessary to regulate the cooperation of the parties. Therefore, how
is it possible to speak of international cooperation in space research if the foundation is not
laid, if those principles are not established which are basic to this cooperation.
The Soviets make international cooperation contingent upon regulation, and
regulation contingent upon U.S. acceptance of the space legal doctrines advanced by
the Soviet Union. The space legal doctrines of the Soviet Union are manipulated
to support the strategic position of the Soviet Union and to undermine the legality
and political acceptability of the national and international security policies of the
‘ Solodovnikov, Speaking Different Languages, International Affairs (Moscow), No. ix, at 46, 48-49,
52 (1963).
“,This difference in revolutionary strategy is discussed in the author’s article, Crane, The Sino-Soviel
Dispute on War and the Cuban Crisis, 8 ORsIS 537-49 (x964). “‘Verbatim Record of the Tenth Meeting, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Sept. lo,
x962, at 61 (A/AC.io 5 /PV.io).
BASIC PRINCIPLES IN SOVIET SPACE LAW
United States.“0 The Soviets have tried to drive home the propaganda charge that
any U.S. opposition to Soviet space legal doctrines is contrary to the requirements
of “peaceful cooperation.” By this tactic they are trying to brand the United States
as an enemy of peace, and in turn to justify their own hostile activities. The
duplicity of the Soviet use of the term “peaceful cooperation” is well illustrated
by the fact that the above quoted statement by Morozov was made on September io,
1962, at the very time that the Soviets were suddenly and secretly establishing a
strategic missile base in the heart of the Western Hemisphere ioo miles from the
state of Florida.’
III
The third basic principle of Soviet space law is “general and complete disarmament.” This principle is discussed in the new Zhukov symposium. In his
chapter entitled “Space Law as a Result of Technological Progress,” M. I. Lazarev,
who has for years been a principal interpreter of the interrelationship between
Soviet military strategy and space law, states that “the most important goal in the
development of space law will be the prevention of imperialist expansion and
militarism in space.” He attacks the counterforce doctrines of Secretary of Defense
McNamara, which are designed to limit any nuclear war, if one should break out,
to military targets, in order to provide the maximum incentive for both sides to stop
the war before it could spread to cities. Soviet strategists oppose this doctrine primarily because it undercuts the Soviet use of the psychological threat that nuclear
holocaust will be the inevitable result of any firm United States action against
Communist expansionist moves. The relationship of space law to Secretary McNamara’s strategy consists in the fact that the American strategy of counterforce was
made possible to a large extent by the perfection of space observation satellites which
indicate with a still considerable degree of reliability where the military targets, such
as ICBMs, are in the Soviet Union. Lazarev warns that any attempt to legalize space
observation satellites, or space interception and inspection, would lead to the creation
of a Damocles sword hanging over mankind. He states that this would result
because the U. S. satellites [which in our view are in the nature of arms control
satellites designed to prevent war] are launched, as he puts it, “to facilitate the
unleashing of aggressive, so-called preventive war… against the socialist countries.”’”
16 This manipulation of Soviet space legal doctrine is developed in detail in the author’s article, Crane,
Soviet Attitude Toward International Space Law, supra note io.
“‘Analysis of Soviet negotiating tactics in the United Nations indicates that the obstructionist function
of the unrealistic Soviet political demands in the U.N. disarmament committee is served in the U.N.
space committee by the unrealistic Soviet preconditions for peaceful cooperation. It appears that recently
the Soviets have started to mix their tactics by injecting some of their disarmament demands, such as
the liquidation of foreign military bases, into the discussions in the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space. See note 22 infra.
11 Lazarev, Space Law as a Result of Technological Progress (in Russian), ZsuKov, op. cit. supra
note I, at 163.
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
Lazarev states that space law and international space cooperation must be based on,
and therefore are contingent upon, the prohibition of American military uses of
space by the demilitarization and neutralization of outer space within the overall
framework of what he calls “disarmament law.”
This “disarmament law” had its genesis at the same time that the Soviets proclaimed the policy of “peaceful coexistence” during the mid-fifties. The Soviets
attempt to provide a legal framework for their campaign for “general and complete disarmament” by interpreting the Charter of the United Nations to require
the acceptance of the Soviet program of general and complete disarmament in order
to fulfill the original goal of the United Nations, namely the creation of a world-wide
system of collective security.
The Soviet writers on the law of disarmament, among whom the foremost is
probably Mr. Bogdanov, base their attempt to create a new international legal
principle of general and complete disarmament (GCD) on articles eleven and
twenty-six of the United Nations Charter and on the unanimously approved Resolution 1378 of the Fourteenth Session of the U.N. General Assembly in x959. Some
Soviet jurists, among them Romanov, believe that neither articles eleven nor twentysix create a legal obligation for GCD but merely provide jurisdiction for the U.N.
General Assembly and Security Council over GCD. Most Soviet lawyers, including
Tunkin and Bogdanov, admit that Resolution 1378, because of the nature of U.N.
resolutions, cannot create a legal obligation. Therefore, the Soviets have embarked
on a general campaign by their own efforts to create for their law of GCD the status
of an accepted legal obligation.
They do this by insisting that the highest goal of mankind is the Soviet program
for GCD and that this GCD therefore must be the original goal of the United
Nations, though it was first announced as a Soviet foreign policy goal by Premier
Khrushchev in 1959. Just as in their attempts to create an obligatory troika in the
United Nations and in the International Court of Justice (an attempt which is repeated in the recent Zhukov space law book), the Soviets are attempting by their
campaign of GCD to harness the entire United Nations and thereby the nations of
the world to their own Soviet disarmament program.
The military advantages which the Soviets hope to gain from acceptance of its
program of GCD are well known to disarmament negotiators. These derive mainly
from the Soviet insistence on U.S. disarmament without the reliable inspection
necessary to assure Soviet reciprocation; and from the Soviet insistence that in order
to achieve GCD the United States must first agree to Soviet proposals to realign the
power structure of the world under the guise of “reducing international tensions.”
The first goal, i.e., U.S. disarmament, the Soviets hope to achieve by a psychological
campaign designed to convince the peoples and leaders of the world that the future
of mankind depends on American acceptance of disarmament without realistic
inspection. This type of disarmament could result in unilateral disarmament of
U.S. deterrent forces both through the voluntary destruction by the United States
BASIC PRINCIPLES IN SOVIET SPACE LAW 951
of its existing weapons and-more importantly-by the failure of the United States
to modernize its weapons arensal. In a world of disarmament without realistic
inspection, such a failure to modernize would permit the Soviets to win the technological arms race by getting a generation ahead in advanced weapons systems,
particularly those which in the future may be most effectively used in outer space.
This in turn would permit the Soviets in effect to force unilateral disarmament on
the United States.
The nature of this Soviet goal has been explained by the Soviets often during
the last half century and there is no evidence that this goal has changed. As early
as 1916, Lenin stated: “Only after the proletariat has disarmed the bourgeoisie wil it
be able, without betraying its world historical mission, to throw all armaments on
the scraphead.” In 1928 the resolution of the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International emphasized that “The aim of the Soviet proposals for general
and complete disarmament is to propagate the fundamental Marxian postulates that
disarmament and the abolition of war are possible only with the fall of capitalism.”
On January 6, i96r, Premier Khrushchev made the point that “The struggle for
disarmament.., is an effective struggle against imperialism.” This struggle is also
“an active struggle against imperialism,” but above all it is an active struggle “for
restricting its military potentialities.”
On January 2, 1964, Pravda published the reply of Premier Khrushchev to the
question, “What do you think should be done to ensure that atomic energy and
the achievements of technology are used for the good of mankind.” Khrushchev
said: “The best solution of this problem is to get rid of all the social and national
causes of the outbreak of any kind of war, a thing which can only be accomplished
with the victory of socialism all over the world.” It is noteworthy that one cannot
accuse the Soviets of insincerity, because for those who take the trouble to study
in detail Soviet policy on peaceful coexistence and disarmament, the Communists
make it abundantly clear what they have in mind.
The second goal of the Soviet program of GCD which they have attempted to
elevate to the level of international law is the requirement that prior to GCD the
West must end the cold war. This was first put forth during the post-test ban
period on November 8, 1963, when the Soviet Union circulated a proposed amendment to a resolution which would urge the Geneva disarmament conference in
January 1964 to concentrate on tension reduction as a preliminary to disarmament.
The Soviets wanted the United States to renounce the use of force of any kind in
opposing Communist revolutions; to abandon its foreign bases and military commitments; to acknowledge Communist conquests, particularly in Central and
Eastern Europe as permanent; and for good measure, to help the Communist world
through trade, aid, and friendly relations to overcome its economic weaknesses and
increase its political acceptability. Do all those things, say the Communists, and
the cold war will end tomorrow. End the cold war and we can make progress on
the most pressing problem of our time, namely general and complete disarmament.
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
The present complete impasse in Geneva on the agenda, I believe, indicates what
the United States thinks of this abuse of the desires of the world for peace and
security. The new Soviet “disarmament law” is of vital importance as a basic
principle of Soviet space law because the use of the Soviet GCD bargaining game
has become the story of our failure to reach any really meaningful agreements in
this area.
I shall not go into a discussion of the specific principles of Soviet space law.
These include “liability for damages to the interests of other states,” and “freedom of
outer space.” The latter was discussed particularly clearly by Cheprov in the recent
Soviet space law symposium and by the Hungarian representative to the United
Nations Space Committee on December 3, 1963P0 Suffice it to say that agreement
on these principles is explicitly conditioned on U.S. acceptance of the Soviet concept of peaceful coexistence and of the Soviet program of GCD.
This is particularly true for one of the most important of all Soviet general
principles of space law: demilitarization and neutralization of outer space.
Whereas the Soviets prior to 1962 advocated the adoption of a legal principle
calling for the use of space for peaceful uses only-and by this they meant nonmilitary purposes-this policy changed in 1962 to legalize military uses, and now
has gone so far that the Soviets are beginning to designate even the attempt to
inspect one of their military space satellites as an act of preventive war.
This Soviet policy of legalizing the military uses of space has been stated in
increasingly plain terms by the Communist representatives to the U.N. Space
Committee. On April 22, 1963, the Czechoslovakian delegate opposed the indusion in a draft of space legal principles of a “provision prohibiting the use of outer
space for war purposes.” He added: “Practical implementation of . . . [article 2(4)
of the Charter and operative paragraph i(a) of the General Assembly Resolution
i72i (XVI) on the peaceful uses of space] could be ensured only by the negotiation
and conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament.” 20 On
May 3, 1963, the Soviet representative stated that the Soviet Union had adopted
what he called a “realistic approach to the question and considered that the problem
of the prohibition of the military use of outer space could be solved only in the
context of disarmament.“2 1
The Soviet representative stated his position quite clearly in the First Committee
during the discussion on International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space, on December 2, 1963, as follows:
The draft declaration does not and could not, of course, deal with the matter of military
uses of outer space. As the members of the Committee all know, the Soviet Union has
often stated that it is prepared, within the framework of a program of general and
“*Verbatim Record, U.N. First Committee, Dec. 3, 1963, at 28 (A/C.I/PV.r 3 43 ).
o Summary Record of the Twentieth Meeting, U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,
Legal Subcommittee, April 22, 1963, at 9 (A/AC.1o5/C.2/SR.2o). 21 Summary Record of the Twenty-eighth Meeting, U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space, Legal Subcommittee, May 3, 1963, at 14 (A/AC.xo5/C.2/SR.28).
BASIC PRINCIPLES IN SOVIET SPACE LAW 953
complete disarmament under strict international control [which is the standard Soviet
jargon], to destroy all types of weapons. That would also solve the problem of prohibiting
the use of outer space for military purposes. However, we did not agree and still do not
agree with attempts to divorce the matter of the military uses of outer space from other
measures of disarmament which are intimately linked to it. As has been stated many
times, the question of the prohibition of the use of outer space for military ends is
organically linked with the question of the liquidation of foreign military bases on the
territory of other countries. It is quite clear that the question of the prohibition of the
military uses of outer space can be solved only in the context of disarmament, with
parallel and simultaneous liquidation of foreign military bases on the territory of other
countries. 22
This statement acquires particular importance because it is the first time since the
Cuban crisis that the Soviet representatives in the U.N. Space Committee have tied
the demilitarization of outer space to the abolition of U.S. military bases.
On December 5, 1963, the Ukranian delegate went even further and stated that:
The representative of the United States declared that the above mentioned agreements
on space “should help to create the confidence needed here on earth for greater progress in disarmament and cooperation in all areas.” Without challenging this statement, we
nevertheless would like to stress that the main question is that of general and complete
disarmament and it is upon the way in which this problem is solved that, to a large
extent, hinges the solution of other unsolved problems. 2 3
In other places the Soviet representatives made possibly ominous remarks to
the effect that the wording of the agreement over which the United States was
rejoicing was broad enough to encompass all of the original points (except the
prohibition of private enterprise in space) which the Soviets had used for two years
since the inception of the U.N. Space Committee to block all progress in the
development of space law 4 The clearest statement was made a year earlier, on
December lo, 1962, during the post-Cuban detente by the Soviet representative who
stated that the militarization of space could be overcome only by the “liquidation
of the cold war,” of course on Communist terms.
During the fall 1963 session of the U.N. Space Committee, Academician
Blagonrarov commented on September io, 1963 that after the test ban treaty “the
Soviet delegation considers it essential once more to stress the importance of a com-
“Verbatim Record, U.N. First Committee, Dec. 2, 1963, at 41-42 (A/C.i/PV. 3 4 3 ).
“Verbatim Record, U.N. First Committee, Dec. 5, 1963, at 43-45 (A/C.X/PV.13 4 5 ). (Emphasis
added.)
“Provisional Verbatim Record of the Twenty-fourth Meeting, U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space, Nov. 22, 1963, at 51 (A/AC.io 5/PV.. 4 ). The provisional record includes the statement:
“The draft includes the most important basic legal principles which, one way or another, were touched
upon in the course of the work of our Committee and of the Legal Subcommittee. That is why, as
has been stated here, the draft . . . will, we hope, meet the interests of all the Member States of the
United Nations.” In the Additional Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,
Nov. 27, 1963 (A/5549/Add.z), this wording was changed to read: “The draft includes important basic
legal principles .. “ On Dec. 2, 1963, the Soviet delegate used the following wording: “In it we find reflected most important fundamental legal principles which are mentioned in various guises
during the discussion on this matter. Verbatim Record, U.N. First Committee, Dec. 2, 1963, at 37
(A/C.Z/PV/x 3 42).
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
plete solution of this question that prevents the arbitrary holding of space research
and experiments. … ,”’ Three days later, on September 13, 1963, he made the
statement that the test ban treaty had “removed the possibility of harmful experiments in outer space for the time being.“26
The most startling of all statements on the military uses of outer space ever
made by a responsible Soviet citizen is contained in the introductory chapter of the
Zhukov symposium on space law. Zhukov indicated, as he first did in August 1962,21
that space observation is aggressive, but bombs in orbit are not. He stated that
self-defense under article fifty-one of the U.N. Charter does not permit the interception of bombs in orbit because the mere presence of bombs in orbit does not
constitute the necessary armed attack. He then proceeded to develop a new and
remarkable principle of Soviet space law, namely that if a state finds out that the
satellite of another country contains a nuclear bomb, any attempt to disable it would
constitute an act of “preventive war.” The strategic significance of this term
consists in the fact that for the Soviets, knowledge of an impending preventive war
is a legitimate cause for a just pre-emptive attack on the United States. This
statement is undoubtedly designed as an attempt at psychological warfare to instill
in U.S. readers the proper fear of nuclear escalation resulting from any American
attempts at countermeasures, for example, through the explosion of a nuclear bomb
in the vicinity of the bomb in orbit.
One of the reasons given for this new Soviet space legal principle is the difficulty,
within the current state of the art, reliably to inspect space satellites. Zhukov states:
Under conditions where it is practically impossible to determine the character of the
activity of a space apparatus, the recognition of the right of a state to capture the
apparatus for inspection would be tantamount to the assertion of complete arbitrariness
and lack of law in this new sphere of human activity. How would one have any
guarantee that space ships with a cosmonaut on board following exclusively peaceful
purposes would not be destroyed by a state which considered that it endangered its
security.28
This reasoning is most interesting in view of the recent Soviet indication that
the Soviets must push space military research and development and that “it is
necessary to have suitable means of providing for the timely detection of space
apparatuses of the enemy and for their rapid destruction or neutralization. 20 In
5 Verbatim Record of the Twenty-first Meeting, U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space, Sept. io, x963, at 41 (A/AC.1o 5 /PV.2z). “ Verbatim Record of the Twenty-second Meeting, U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space, Sept. 13, 1963, at 45-50 (A/AC.o 5 /PV.22). (Emphasis added.) “
7See Crane, The Beginnings of Marxist Space Jurisprudence, 57 Am. J. INT’L L. 6×5, 622 (1963).
“ Zhukov, The Legal Regime of Outer Space in the Contemporary Period (in Russian), ZuuKov,
op. cit. supra note I, at 33.
‘IV. D. SOKOLOVSIY (MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION) (ED.), VOYENNAYA STRATEGIYA (MILITARY
STRATEGY) 395 (2d ed. 1963). The means which the Soviets may have in mind are indicated by
another reference in this book which emphasizes the importance of electro-magnetic warfare for the
“destruction or jamming of the electronic fuses of bombs and missiles by electronic radiation, and the
interception of radio signals and generation of interference in the electronic equipment for aerial reconnaissance, navigation, bombing, and in-flight missile guidance.” SoVIET MILITARY STRATrY 337-38
BASIC PINCIPLES IN SOVIET SPACE LAw 955
other words, the Soviets are preparing for the interception and destruction of U.S.
satellites but assert that similar action by the United States against Soviet satellites
would be an act of preventive war.
CONCLUSION
This inconsistency is understandable only if one understands that the Soviets
use international law not as a means to resolve and remove conflict, but rather to
manage and direct conflict in the interests of Communist global expansion. The
Soviets have orchestrated the manipulation of both legal and military doctrines
so that they serve really as two sides of the same coin. They are merely two different
aspects of the single discipline of conflict management. The principles of Soviet
space law, including the three most basic principles of peaceful coexistence, peaceful
cooperation, and disarmament, are fully understandable only within this framework
of analysis.
(translated and with analytical introduction and annotations by Herbert S. Dinerstein, Leon Goure &
Thos. WV. Wolfe, 1963). The Soviets are referring to electronic countermeasures to disable the circuitry of
ICBMs passing through space and to de-trigger their warheads. In the revised edition of this book,
published in August z963, the Soviets also for the first time called attention to U.S. research in the
military use of anti-gravitation, anti-matter, plasma and lasers. See id. 394, 405 (2d ed. 1963).

OPERATIONAL POLICIES
This Charter of Black Star Initiative, as ratified on the Twenty Second of October of the year 2900 hereby sets aside the rules, regulations, and code of this organization as determined by its founders.

Article One, Conduct and Expectations of Enlisted Employees:
Each employee enlisted in The Initiative is expected to follow the rules, regulations, and conduct set forth under Article One and its following sections.

I. An employee is expected to hold their self with honor, respect, and professionalism at all times.

II. A employee is expected, while on the battlefield, to follow the orders of their superior officer to the best of his or her ability.

III. A employee is expected to fulfill their designated position to the best of their abilities. In a competitive setting, a employee that is found to be under performing may have their individual performance reviewed by their section peers.

Article Two, Chain of Command & Positions:
Employee are subordinate to each officer in their command structure above them, and are in command of each employee subordinate to themselves. Each employee is expected to rise to the expectations and duties of their station as set forth under Article Two and its following sections.

I. Rankings and Positions are laid out thus, and in order from subordinate to superior:

a) Recruit – A probationary / trial rank which indicates that a employee is new to the mercenary unit and has not yet been assigned to a section.

b) Private – Employees who are experienced members and have accumulated an in-depth knowledge of their sector.

c) Sergeant – Employees who have been assigned command of a section and are the superior officers to the Wraith within that section.

d) Captain – Employees who are the founders of The Initiative. Captains are five in number and will not increase or decrease. Special circumstances may arise that will require the appointment of a new Captain. The new Captain is voted upon by other Captains following a majority vote.

e) Honorable Representative – Employee who are external from rank system and represent other units.

II. A employee may be designated section leader if those in the section are in agreement with the designation. A section must have at least four (4) members to be formed and may not exceed 8 members in total.

III. When promoted to a position (Sergeant) that allows command of a section, it is the responsibility of the promoted employee to enlist their subordinates. An officer is encouraged to form tight bonds with specific members, but is allowed to enlist any member subordinate to them for command directly before a mission, unless a superior officer chooses otherwise. Section leaders are also expected to actively build game-play chemistry between members under their command.

Article Three, Code of Conduct & Punishment:
A employee enlisted in The Initiative may be subject to dismissal (removal from the mercenary unit) based upon infractions committed. Infractions are classified as outlined below:
I. Minor Infractions – In the event that a minor infraction has been committed by a member and there is sufficient supporting evidence of the infraction, the member will be given a written warning from a superior officer. If three (3) minor infractions are committed within a 30-day period, the offender is removed from the unit. If at the end of this period no infractions are committed, the earliest infraction will be removed from that pilots record.

List of Minor Infractions:
EXCESSIVE USE INSULTING OR HARASSING LANGUAGE DIRECTED TOWARDS AN INDIVIDUAL OR A GROUP OF PEOPLE
EXCESSIVE USE OF INAPPROPRIATE LANGUAGE
EXCESSIVE SPAMMING OR TROLLING
RELIGIOUS DEBATES
FREQUENT INSUBORDINATION DURING A COMPETITIVE DROP
II. Major Infractions – In the event that a major infraction has been committed by a member and there is sufficient supporting evidence of the infraction, the aforementioned member will be removed from the mercenary unit and banned from accessing the resources of the unit.

List of Major Infractions:
RACIAL / ETHNIC HARASSMENT
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
REAL-LIFE VIOLENT THREATS
DISTRIBUTION OF REAL-LIFE PERSONAL INFORMATION
POSTING CHEATS, HACKS, TROJAN HORSES OR MALICIOUS PROGRAMS

These are the rules, regulation, and code as determined by the Founders of The Initiative, on the signing of this Charter, on the Twenty Second of October of the year 2013. All who are enlisted amongst the ranks of The Initiative must abide by these rules or find themselves punished as set aside by the rules.